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DISMANTLING THE WALL
Charles Shane Ellison* & Anjum Gupta**
INTRODUCTION
Between 2017 and 2021, the Trump Administration waged an unprecedented battle on U.S. asylum structure, procedure, and substantive law. Seeking to alter long-standing legal principles and practices in a host of areas, the
former administration’s efforts to demolish asylum protections were systematic and comprehensive. The Immigration Policy Tracking Project cataloged
no fewer than ninety-six discrete policy and regulatory changes that the former administration implemented to curtail access to asylum. 1 While some of
the administration’s actions, such as the decision to separate children from
their parents at the border, were carried out in the open, many other actions
were largely hidden from public view. In their totality, scholars have characterized those changes without much hyperbole as the end of asylum in the
U.S., 2 a veritable administrative wall to refugees.
Despite widespread initial optimism upon the election of a new president
and some incremental steps, the Biden Administration has yet to roll back the
majority of these changes, let alone take steps to expand access to asylum or
increase fairness in the system. Within his first month in office, President
Biden promised to undertake a comprehensive review of the U.S. asylum system and promulgate regulations consistent with our international legal obligations within 270 days; 3 however, that deadline has come and gone without
any proposed regulations or an explanation for their absence. 4

* Shane Ellison is a Senior Lecturing Fellow and Supervising Attorney in the Immigrant
Rights Clinic at Duke Law School.
** Anjum Gupta is Vice Dean, Professor of Law & Judge Chester J. Straub Scholar, and
Director of the Immigrant Rights Clinic at Rutgers Law School.
1. 97 Policies, IMMIGR. POL’Y TRACKING PROJECT, https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/?subject_matter=asylum-withholding-and-cat [perma.cc/7WLW-D4A2]. The Immigration
Policy Tracking Project (IPTP) catalogs the known immigration policies of the Trump Administration. Each entry contains underlying source documents, relevant predecessor policies, and the current status of each policy. IPTP was created by Professor Lucas Guttentag and is maintained by
students at Stanford and Yale law schools supported by a team of immigration experts. See IMMIGR.
POL’Y TRACKING PROJECT, https://immpolicytracking.org/home [perma.cc/C7SG-HTPT].
2. See generally ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ , JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES & PHILIP S. SCHRAG,
THE END OF ASYLUM (2021).
3. See Exec. Order No. 14010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,267, 8,271 (Feb. 2, 2021).
4. CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., DEADLY INERTIA: NEEDLESS DELAY OF
“PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” REGULATIONS PUTS ASYLUM SEEKERS AT RISK 1 (2022),
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Deadly%20Inertia%20-%20PSG%20Regs%20Guide
_Feb.%202022.pdf [perma.cc/MHQ6-72L5].
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The contemporary U.S. asylum system was born through the robustly bipartisan 1980 Refugee Act. 5 From that moment to the present, the nation has
not witnessed such unmitigated antipathy towards refugees and asylum seekers as during the Trump era. The toll paid by these changes, measured both in
human lives and the erosion of our national values, is staggering. Yet, the fissures revealed by this unparalleled period of restriction of access to asylum
can guide us both in understanding the extent of the present asylum crises and
in knowing how best to move forward.
Through all its bluster about building a physical wall along the southern
border to keep refugees and other immigrants out, the Trump Administration
succeeded in erecting an administrative wall, preventing countless bona fide
refugees from seeking or obtaining the protection for which they are eligible.
To date, that wall has not been taken down. At best, the Biden Administration
has tinkered with this barrier to refugees, and at worst, it has deliberately left
some sections standing.
In this Essay, we will summarize the status quo of this crisis. We will highlight warning signs that began to appear even before the Trump Administration to understand how we reached this point. We will then propose solutions
to chart a pathway forward, exploring strategies for implementing lasting reforms aimed at tearing down this administrative wall and replacing it with a
more fair and welcoming system.
I.

WHERE DO WE STAND NOW?

After four years of sustained efforts by the Trump Administration to
erode asylum protections in the U.S., the nation is still at a crossroads. A palpable tension persists between the long-standing humanitarian ethos that
beckons to our shores those “huddled masses yearning to breathe free” 6 and a
xenophobic impulse bent on dramatically reducing immigration. As one
Trump Administration official confessed, their “mantra [had] persistently
been presenting aliens with multiple unsolvable dilemmas to impact their calculus for choosing to make the arduous journey to [the U.S.].” 7 But, as the
Somali refugee and poet Warsan Shire has poignantly observed, “no one leaves
home unless home is the mouth of a shark.” 8 Thus, the Trump Administration’s efforts would have to be quite cruel to alter the outcome of the archetypal refugee’s tragic risk calculus.

5. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.)
6. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, POETRY FOUND., https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46550/the-new-colossus [perma.cc/CQU7-R7RU].
7. Julia Ainsley, Stephen Miller Wants Border Patrol, Not Asylum Officers, to Determine
Migrant Asylum Claims, NBC NEWS (July 29, 2019, 7:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics
/immigration/stephen-miller-wants-use-border-agents-screen-migrants-cut-number-n1035831
[perma.cc/8YEC-8D86] (emphasis added).
8. “Home” by Warsan Shire, FACING HIST. & OURSELVES, https://www.facinghistory.org
/standing-up-hatred-intolerance/warsan-shire-homeh [perma.cc/WC9E-9BJH].
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In pursuit of their goal to create “unsolvable dilemmas” for refugees and
asylum seekers, in 2018, the former administration shocked the country
through its “zero-tolerance” program that intentionally separated thousands
of children from their parents in the hopes of creating a “deterrent effect.” 9
Although the formal policy was rescinded in the wake of widespread public
opprobrium, efforts to erect hurdles for refugees and asylum seekers persisted,
often out of the public eye.
By the final years of the Trump Administration, through a combination
of a lowered cap on refugee admissions and “increased vetting” processes for
refugee admissions, the U.S. reached its lowest ebb of resettlement numbers
in the forty-year history of the Refugee Act, descending beneath even the years
that followed 9/11. 10 Yet, the true impact of this reduction went beyond just
the denial of resettlement opportunities during one of the worst global refugee
crises since WWII. The dramatic reductions in refugee admission also ensured long-term damage to the U.S. resettlement apparatus writ large by causing many refugee resettlement organizations—whose funding streams derive
in part from per capita payments from the U.S. government for each refugee
resettled—to close shop. By the end of the fiscal year 2019, more than one
hundred resettlement offices in the U.S. were shuttered due to plummeting
refugee admissions. 11
Asylum processing at the border likewise ground to a halt as a result of
iterative and culminating procedural changes. The litany of changes included:
altering the internal guidelines for asylum officers to drive down positive credible fear findings; creating tortuously long wait times to seek asylum at the
border (resulting in a waitlist that eventually climbed to 26,000 individuals);
enlisting Customs and Border Protection officials—who had made headlines
for coercing asylum seekers to withdraw their requests for asylum—to conduct asylum screenings; and creating the “Remain in Mexico” policy (deceptively called Migration Protection Protocols or MPP) that forced nearly 71,000
people to live in perilous conditions along the U.S.-Mexico border while waiting for a hearing, at which virtually no one would have access to counsel and
where nearly all decisions resulted in denial. 12 Layered on top of these changes

9. Philip Bump, Here Are the Administration Officials Who Have Said That Family Separation Is Meant as a Deterrent, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/politics/wp/2018/06/19/here-are-the-administration-officials-who-have-said-that-familyseparation-is-meant-as-a-deterrent [perma.cc/V8MH-E6D6].
10. Kira Monin, Jeanne Batalova & Tianjian Lai, Refugees and Asylees in the United States,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 13, 2021), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-andasylees-united-states-2021 [perma.cc/6QWU-VBPY].
11. Tania Karas, US Refugee Agencies Wither as Trump Administration Cuts Numbers
to Historic Lows, WORLD (Sept. 27, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-0927/us-refugee-agencies-wither-trump-administration-cuts-numbers-historic-lows [perma.cc
/N7TJ-HB4N].
12. See SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 47–67; Adolfo Flores & Hamed Aleaziz,
The Supreme Court Ruled That Biden Must Restart Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” Program,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 25, 2021, 1:49 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adolfoflo-
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were additional grounds for denial for asylum seekers who sought to avoid
this labyrinth of “unsolvable dilemmas” by entering the U.S. surreptitiously
outside of a designated point of entry, or who transited through another country en route to the U.S. without first seeking asylum there. 13 The coup de grâce
of the Trump Administration’s war on asylum at the border was the imposition of Title 42 expulsions, which used the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to shut off what little trickle remained of asylum seekers pursuing
protection along the southern border. 14
The former administration’s ire was not cabined to just border policy,
however; asylum processing within the interior likewise suffered as a result of
significant substantive changes to asylum law. One category of asylum claims
given particular attention during the Trump presidency involved putative refugees fleeing persecution inflicted by nonstate persecutors. Threatened by
transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups to domestic abusers
and rebel factions, a significant number of asylum seekers flee their countries
due to persecution committed at the hands of nongovernmental actors. 15 Indeed, the lion’s share of asylum claims brought by applicants fleeing Mexico
and the Northern Triangle (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are
nonstate persecutor claims. 16
The former administration characterized these claims as illegitimate and
made significant efforts to greatly limit their probability of success. Specifically, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions wrote in a 2018 precedent decision that “[g]enerally,” claims based upon harms “perpetrated by nongovernmental actors will not qualify for asylum.” 17 This conclusion stemmed
in part from the attorney general’s holding that when a persecutor is a nonstate actor, an applicant for protection must establish that her government either “condone[s]” her persecution or is “complete[ly] helpless[]” to protect

res/the-supreme-court-ruled-that-biden-must-restart-trumps?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2021Aug25&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief [perma.cc/
QTX5-P6QE].
13. See SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 47.
14. See id. at 79–86.
15. See generally Charles Shane Ellison & Anjum Gupta, Unwilling or Unable? The Failure
to Conform the Nonstate Actor Standard in Asylum Claims to the Refugee Act, 52 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 441 (2021) (setting forth a framework for the nonstate actor standard under the
Refugee Act).
16. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND
MEXICO, 15 (2015) https://www.unhcr.org/56fc31864.html [perma.cc/HP34-2H8U] (stating
that women fled due to violence at the hands of criminal armed groups and due to “brutal
domestic violence”); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN ON THE
RUN: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN LEAVING CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED
FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 44–45 (2014) https://www.unhcr.org/56fc266f4.html
[perma.cc/T3JY-ZFS6] (citing gang violence and domestic violence as reasons children flee).
17. A-B- (Matter of A-B- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018) (emphasis added).
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her from such persecution, 18 a standard vastly more difficult to satisfy than
the preexisting one. 19
His conclusion also stemmed from his assessment that “[w]hen private
actors inflict violence based on a personal relationship with a victim, then the
victim’s membership in a large[] group may well not be ‘one central reason’
for the abuse.” 20 In other words, Sessions casted doubt upon whether such
victims could prove the required causal link, or nexus, between the persecution they suffered or fear and a statutorily protected ground.
Finally, Sessions sought to further delegitimize claims involving domestic
violence in particular by overturning an Obama-era precedent decision that
had recognized that women who were persecuted by their abusers because of
their inability to leave their domestic relationship were members of a valid
“social group” under the Refugee Act. 21 In upending that settled precedent,
Sessions argued that a social group so defined was impermissibly circular, insufficiently particular, and inadequately distinct in the eyes of the society in
question. 22
The following year, under Attorney General Barr, the administration continued the onslaught by overturning another Obama-era precedent that had
recognized that persecution based upon one’s family membership could qualify one for asylum protection—another blow to a large category of claims. 23
Even in the final days of the Trump Administration, the acting attorney general continued working to restrict access to asylum by doubling down on the
already heightened nonstate actor and nexus tests the administration had created in prior decisions. 24
The foregoing summary is nonexhaustive, but the enumerated examples
listed here illustrate the extent to which the Trump Administration could implement distortions to long-standing procedural and substantive requirements related to asylum eligibility, all without any assistance from Congress.
In their combination, these changes amounted to an administrative wall of
ineligibility, barring from protection those “huddled masses yearning to
breathe free.”
For its part, the Biden Administration has recognized that violence “perpetrated by criminal gangs, trafficking networks, and other organized criminal organizations” along with “sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence”
are among some of the root causes of migration from the Northern Triangle,

18. Id. at 337 (quoting Galina v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
19. Ellison & Gupta, supra note 15, at 463–66.
20. Matter of A-B- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 338.
21. Id. at 346 (overruling A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014)).
22. Id. at 334–36.
23. L-E-A- (Matter of L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 596 (A.G. 2019) (overruling in part
L-E-A- (Matter of L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (B.I.A. 2017)).
24. A-B- (Matter of A-B- II), 28 I. & N. Dec. 199, 201–02 (A.G. 2021).
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and can give rise to viable claims for refugee protection. 25 As noted above,
President Biden has ordered a “comprehensive examination of current rules,
regulations, precedential decisions, and internal guidelines” with the goal of
evaluating “whether the United States provides protection for those fleeing
domestic or gang violence . . . consistent with international standards.” 26 And
the new administration has rolled back a small number of the harmful practices and precedents from the Trump era. 27
However, there remains much work to be done. The Biden Administration continues to wade through the morass of tangled policies, precedents, and
regulations it inherited. It has failed to meet its own deadline for promulgating
regulations that would correct some long-standing deficiencies in asylum
law. 28 Hundreds of children have yet to be reunited with their parents. 29 And
the Remain in Mexico policy has been forcibly reinstated by court order. 30
Yet, inaction is not the only problem at present. Deeply troubling developments are flowing out of the Biden Administration as well. The Biden Administration defied international and U.S. legal obligations through its mass
expulsion of Haitians along the border in the fall of 2021. 31 On August 20,
2021, regulations were proposed to streamline the credible fear screening process that would also curtail a fulsome hearing before an immigration judge. 32
While the proposed regulations helpfully provide for nonadversarial adjudication of applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture by asylum officers following positive
credible fear screenings, they also make review of errant negative decisions

25. See Exec. Order No. 14010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,267, 8,268 (Feb. 2, 2021).
26. Id. at 8,271.
27. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Termination of the Migrant Protection Protocols Program,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 2 (June 1, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0601_termination_of_mpp_program.pdf [perma.cc/74SE-77FZ]; A-B- (Matter of AB- III), 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021); L-E-A- (Matter of L-E-A- III), 28 I. & N. Dec. 304 (A.G.
2021); A-C-A-A- (Matter of A-C-A-A- II), 28 I. & N. Dec. 351 (A.G. 2021).
28. See CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., supra note 4.
29. Priscilla Alvarez, Parents of 391 Migrant Children Separated at Border Under Trump Still
Have Not Been Found, Court Filing Says, CNN (May 19, 2021, 5:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2021/05/19/politics/ms-l-children-reunited/index.html [perma.cc/Y3CA-56SQ].
30. Joseph Choi, Judge Orders Trump’s ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy to Be Reinstated, HILL
(Aug. 15, 2021, 8:13 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/567918-judge-orderstrumps-remain-in-mexico-policy-to-be-reinstated [perma.cc/YYH9-AVZF]; Flores & Aleaziz,
supra note 12.
31. UNITED NATIONS, UN Rights Experts Condemn US Expulsion of Haitian Migrants
and Refugees, UN NEWS (Oct. 25, 2021), https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1103962
[perma.cc/RR66-9WWD].
32. Rebecca Beitsch, Biden Administration Seeks to Speed Review of Asylum Cases, HILL
(Aug. 18, 2021, 10:09 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/568351-biden-administration-seeks-to-speed-review-of-asylum-cases [perma.cc/67J9-CCNH].
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more difficult to reverse. 33 Despite a number of comments criticizing a deficiency of due process in the proposal, the interim final rule published on
March 29, 2022—while modifying the review procedures—continues to prioritize rapid processing and tight deadlines to the exclusion of full and fair
adjudications. 34 And perhaps most concerning, the administration not only
continued the use of harmful Title 42 public health expulsions at the southern
border, but it vigorously defended them even in the face of court rulings that
held the expulsions unlawful and pronouncements by public health officials
that they are unnecessary. 35 Although the administration recently announced
that the order calling for the expulsions will be terminated as of May 23,
2022, 36 the order could be reinstated at any time, and there is some risk that
the termination could be enjoined, as it has already been challenged by a group
of states in federal court. 37 In short, the U.S. asylum system remains in a state
of crisis. And this crisis coincides with the large influx of Afghan evacuees
arriving in the U.S., thousands of whom must seek asylum. 38
Significant continued efforts will be required just to reverse Trump era
changes and revert to the status quo ante. Yet, simply undoing the damage

33. See Ted Hesson, U.S. Plans to Double Number of Asylum Officers in Biden Border
Overhaul, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-plans-double-number-asylum-officers-biden-border-overhaul-2021-08-18 [perma.cc/FB6Z-6TSN] (last updated Aug. 18, 2021,
11:31 AM).
34. Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding
of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 18,078 (Mar. 29, 2022)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 212, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235, 1240).
35. Claire Hansen, Biden Administration Digs in Heels on Controversial Title 42 Border Order, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 3, 2021, 12:02 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2021-08-03/biden-administration-digs-in-heels-on-controversial-title-42-border-order
[perma.cc/A6LN-K9PX]; Sarah Sherman-Stokes & Lindsay M. Harris, Despite Promises, Biden
Looks a Lot Like Trump on Border Issues, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 20, 2021, 4:00 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/despite-promises-biden-looks-a-lot-like-trumpon-border-issues [perma.cc/74TJ-AR58]; Letter to CDC Director Walensky, HHS Secretary
Becerra, and DHS Secretary Mayorkas on the August 2021 Title 42 Order, COLUM. PUB. HEALTH
(Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/sept_1_2021_title_42
_letter.pdf [perma.cc/KEK2-UVKB] [hereinafter Letter to CDC Director]; Huisha-Huisha v.
Mayorkas, No. 21-5200, 2022 WL 628061, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 2022) (holding that Title 42
expulsions without screening for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is contrary to law); Title 42 Termination with Respect to Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children, CDC (Mar. 12, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2022/s0311-title-42-termination.html [perma.cc/FR7WPEUZ] (exempting unaccompanied children but leaving intact existing Title 42 orders for adult
asylum seekers).
36. CDC Public Health Determination and Termination of Title 42 Order, CDC (Apr. 1,
2022), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2022/s0401-title-42.html [perma.cc/SM28-QR7L].
37. Rebecca Beitsch, Three GOP States Sue over End of Title 42, HILL (April 4, 2022, 11:47
AM),
https://thehill.com/latino/3258301-three-gop-states-sue-over-end-of-title-42
[perma.
cc/38CH-765D].
38. Michelle Hackman, Afghan Refugees in the U.S.: How They’re Vetted, Where They’re Going, and How to Help, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2022, 7:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanrefugees-in-the-u-s-how-theyre-vetted-where-theyre-going-and-how-to-help-11630677004
[perma.cc/MV2R-43SB].
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wrought by the former administration is not enough, because any advances
made now can be just as easily reversed by a future neo-Trumpian president.
If the U.S. asylum system is to be securely reconstructed, additional lasting
reforms are required. To lay the groundwork for exploring such durable solutions, we will proceed to analyze how we got here.
II.

HOW DID WE REACH THIS POINT?

In the wake of the horrors of the Holocaust, the global community of nations convened to create the 1950 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (popularly known as the Refugee Convention). This document, as
amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, continues to
serve as the historical foundation of the contemporary refugee framework
globally and within the U.S. 39 However, it was not until the passage of the 1980
Refugee Act that the U.S. brought itself into full conformity with its international obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
The Refugee Act defines a refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 40

Legion are the opinions and decisions—issued by courts and the administrative agency entrusted with the interpretation and application of this statute—
describing, defining, and refining the various facets to the refugee definition.
While Congress has passed numerous laws affecting asylum eligibility and
procedure (including statutory bars to filing and relief, screening mechanisms
for claims asserted at the border, relevant burdens of proof, and guidance related to making credibility determinations), it has left the core refugee definition largely untouched. Instead, Congress has preferred to grant wide latitude
to administrative agencies to fill in gaps through the regulatory process, caseby-case adjudication, and interagency policy guidance. And courts have fashioned judicial doctrines of deference—dubbed Chevron deference when the
agency is construing an ambiguous statute, and Auer deference when it is interpreting an ambiguous regulation—that provides additional latitude to the
agency to shape asylum policy.
This legislative flexibility has been both implied and explicit. In addition
to the regular functioning of administrative agencies by virtue of the Admin-

39. The United States acceded to Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention when
it signed on to the Protocol in 1968. See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,
416 (1984); Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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istrative Procedures Act, Congress specifically provided that asylum is a discretionary form of relief and that the Attorney General has been granted the
authority to establish by regulation “additional limitations and conditions,
consistent with [the statute], under which [a noncitizen] shall be ineligible for
asylum.” 41
The Trump Administration unequivocally demonstrated that the inherent and explicit discretionary powers Congress conferred upon the executive
could be easily weaponized and used, if not to defeat the purpose of the Refugee Act, then at least to undermine it. Although many of President Trump’s
policy and regulatory proposals aimed at limiting procedural access to asylum
were quickly enjoined by the courts, 42 some of the more pernicious substantive changes to asylum eligibility, such as those relating to the nonstate actor
test, nexus, and social group law received widespread deference from the
courts of appeals.
For example, in the nonstate-actor context, the Trump Administration,
as noted above, attempted to heighten the standard for demonstrating state
involvement in persecution. Long before the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act,
U.S. adjudicators recognized that a refugee can be one fleeing state-perpetrated persecution or nonstate persecution from which the state is either “unable or unwilling” to provide effective protection. 43 In the decades that
followed, the unable-or-unwilling test was recognized and accepted by the immigration agency and every federal court of appeals. 44 But in 2018, Attorney
General Jeff Sessions wrote in Matter of A-B- I that to satisfy the nonstateactor requirement, an applicant must show that their government either “condone[s]” the persecution or is “complete[ly] helpless[]” to protect them from
such persecution. 45 Despite the linguistic difference between the words “unwilling” and “condone” or the words “unable” and “completely helpless,” Sessions did not acknowledge that he was heightening the standard, let alone
provide a rational explanation for the departure. Sessions’s omission was even
more striking given evidence showing that asylum seekers are twice as likely
to lose their case when the condone-or-complete-helplessness language is
cited than when the unwilling-or-unable test is used. 46

41. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(c).
42. See e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (enjoining the third country transit bar); Pangea Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 512 F.
Supp. 3d 966 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (enjoining Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal;
Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, and 1235), dubbed the “death to asylum” rule, see infra note
83); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining
President Trump’s entry ban proclamation and rule for asylum seekers at the southern border).
43. See, e.g., Rosa v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971);
Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (B.I.A. 1967); Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975).
44. Ellison & Gupta, supra note 15, at 467–91.
45. Matter of A-B- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018).
46. Ellison & Gupta, supra note 15, at 485.
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Nevertheless, courts of appeals in the Second, 47 Third, 48 and Fifth 49 Circuits have deferred to Session’s condone-or-complete-helplessness formulation. While some courts of appeals have questioned the validity of the
condone-or-complete-helplessness test, 50 only the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit has clearly held that the condone-or-complete-helplessness articulation is a new and heightened standard, inconsistent with the traditional
test. 51 Even then, the court held that the agency failed to provide any explanation for the change; it did not foreclose the possibility of the agency providing
a reasonable explanation to which the court would later defer. 52
An equally salient example of the executive branch’s ability to unilaterally
undermine the purposes of the Refugee Act exists in the area of social group
law, where the vast majority of courts have afforded deference to the agency’s
three-part test for analyzing the cognizability of a particular social group. 53
While the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had originally adopted a common sense approach to the statutory term “particular social group,” it later
sought to narrow eligibility by further defining that term.
Initially, the BIA employed the canon of statutory construction ejusdem
generis (meaning of the same kind) to conclude that the ambiguous term
should be construed consistently with the other protected characteristics
listed in the refugee definition: race, religion, nationality, and political opinion. 54 In a carefully reasoned decision in 1985, the BIA held that the common
thread that united each of these protected characteristics is that they all were
grounded in an immutable characteristic, that is, a characteristic that was so
fundamental to one’s identity that one either could not change it or should
not be required to change it. 55 Thus, the very sensible immutability test was

47. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 332–33 (2d Cir. 2020).
48. Galeas Figueroa v. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 77, 91 (3d Cir. 2021).
49. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 232–34 (5th Cir. 2019).
50. See, e.g., Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2020) (holding that because the
familiar unable-or-unwilling test came first, it must control); Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d
154, 164 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Matter of A-B- I but applying the familiar unwilling-or-unable
test); Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 790 n.3, 795 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding that Matter of AB- I, including the condone-or-complete-helplessness standard, had been abrogated).
51. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 898–900 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (concluding that Matter of AB- I adopted a “new, more demanding standard ‘without acknowledging or explaining the
change’ ”) (quoting Appellee’s Brief at 52, Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 195013)).
52. Id. at 900–03.
53. See, e.g., Granada-Rubio v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016); Ordonez Azmen v.
Barr, 965 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2020); S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 550–55 (3d Cir. 2018);
Nolasco v. Garland, 7 F. 4th 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2021); Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 230
(5th Cir. 2019); Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2015); Fuentes v. Barr, 969
F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2020); Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021);
Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 992–93 (10th Cir. 2015); Alvarado v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
984 F.3d 982, 989 (11th Cir. 2020).
54. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
55. Id.
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born for evaluating social groups. A particular social group consisted of a
group of individuals who shared a common immutable characteristic.
Under this test, one would expect that family, gender and sexual orientation, and shared past experiences that place one at risk of persecution would
pass muster. Indeed, a number of groups were readily identified using this
immutability test. In 1988, for example, former police and military were recognized as possessing a shared past experience that could constitute a cognizable social group. 56 In a 1990 decision, members of the LGBT community were
acknowledged as possessing an immutable characteristic. 57 In 1996, clan
membership and women fearing female genital mutilation were likewise recognized as valid social groups. 58
However, as alluded to above, the agency apparently began to harbor concerns that this social group test—though entirely workable—opened access to
protection to just too many people. Thus, beginning in 2006 under the Bush
Administration, the BIA began adding to the social group analysis in an effort
to narrow the pool of potential applicants. 59 The BIA announced that in addition to possessing an immutable characteristic, a viable social group would
now also need to possess social visibility. 60 The BIA claimed that this addition
was consistent with its prior decisions, but questions arose almost immediately regarding how some groups—such as past former association and sexual
orientation—were visible to the extent that those characteristics were often
hidden. 61
Such questions notwithstanding, the BIA continued down this path by
delineating a particularity requirement the following year. There, the BIA held
that a viable social group must be clearly defined and not amorphous, subjective, inchoate, or diffuse. 62 In applying this test, the BIA reasoned that wealth
status was simply too subjective and amorphous to provide a measurable
benchmark for group membership, 63 and thus the particularity prong was
born.
The next year, in 2008, the BIA employed the newly minted social visibility and particularity requirements to hold that Honduran youth perceived to
be affiliated with gangs and Salvadoran youth subjected to gang recruitment
efforts likewise failed under the two additional social group prongs. 64 In the
years that followed, courts began to question the addition of these two nascent
social group requirements and to ask whether the original collection of social

56. Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (B.I.A. 1988).
57. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
58. H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996); Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
59. See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
60. Id. at 959–61.
61. See, e.g., Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011).
62. A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).
63. Id.
64. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
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groups recognized using the immutability test would survive under the newly
formulated rules. In particular, courts reacted to some statements from the
BIA suggesting that groups had to be visible in the sense that one could discern
group membership simply by looking at a person. If this is what social visibility meant, then the new requirement would unquestionably rule out most of
the groups recognized under the immutability test (for example, LGBTQ individuals or women who had not yet undergone female genital cutting), particularly given that refugees go to great lengths to hide the characteristic that
gives rise to their persecution. 65 Moreover, returning to the principle of
ejusdem generis that first guided the BIA in articulating the immutability test,
it would seem that the statutorily recognized characteristics of religion, nationality, and political opinion could likewise fail under any requirement that
one’s protected characteristic be visible to the eye.
To address these criticisms, the BIA issued a pair of decisions in 2014,
clarifying that it was not requiring “ocular visibility,” but “social distinction”;
that is, the society in question should recognize the group as being set apart in
some way, distinct from other members of the country of feared persecution. 66
Since that time, almost every court of appeals in the country has deferred to
this refined three-part test, though it has continued to garner scholarly criticisms that the formulation is not workable and unfairly applied. 67
Nevertheless, the three-prong social group test is as firmly entrenched
now as it has even been. And it continues to provide significant flexibility to
the executive branch to define the scope of protection to social groups, both
new and old. As mentioned above, the Trump Administration used this flexibility to hold that previously recognized gender-based and family-based
groups were no longer cognizable under the test. Consequently, at the end of
the Trump Administration, looking back to when the BIA first departed from
the immutability test in 2006, there was not a single precedent BIA decision
left standing recognizing a viable social group that satisfied the three-pronged
test. 68
Similarly, courts have taken a very deferential posture in relation to the
agency’s elaborations upon the nexus requirement, which mandates applicants to prove that their persecution is “on account of” a statutorily protected

65. See, e.g., Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615; Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604.
66. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211–12 (B.I.A. 2014); M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
236 (B.I.A. 2014).
67. See Benjamin Casper, Katherine Evans, Julia DiBartolomeo Decker & Haley Steptoe,
Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal Standard for “Membership in a Particular
Social Group,” IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 2014, at 11–13, 19–22.
68. Following the creation of the three-prong test, A-R-C-G- and Matter of L-E-A- I were
the only two precedent decisions that had recognized examples of cognizable social groups that
could satisfy that test by the start of the Trump Administration. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. Since both decisions were vacated during his presidency, not a single example
of a cognizable group recognized in a published BIA decision was left by the time he left office.
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characteristic. 69 Long before the Trump Administration, the lack of statutory
or regulatory guidance as to the proper formulation of the nexus requirement
resulted in unequal application of the nexus rule. With respect to nonstate
persecutor claims in particular, immigration judges and the BIA often
weighed more heavily nonprotected reasons for the persecution, even when
protected reasons were present. In domestic violence claims, for example, the
agency denied asylum despite ample country conditions evidence showing
that the majority of victims of abuse are women, reasoning that the abuse occurred on account of the abuser’s desire to control the victim or simply because the abuser is a “despicable person,” rather than on account of the
victim’s gender or membership in a particular social group. 70 The agency
made similarly problematic nexus findings in other contexts, including in
cases involving forced sterilization, human trafficking, forced marriage, religion, gang violence, sexual orientation, and membership in a family. 71
While Congress amended the asylum statute in 2005 through passage of
the REAL ID Act, it largely codified what had already been widely recognized
by courts 72—namely, that a refugee need establish that her protected characteristic was or would be at least one central reason for her past or feared persecution. 73 The BIA would later interpret this statutory language to signify
that in mixed-motive asylum cases “the protected ground cannot play a minor
role[, and] . . . cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to
another reason for harm.” 74 Courts mostly deferred to this interpretation as
well. 75
Arguing that the REAL ID Act did little to solve the problems resulting
from the lack of standards in the nexus analysis, some legal scholars argued
that a simple “but-for” test would suffice in most claims. 76 Again leveraging

69. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 5:8 (2021) (noting
widespread deference to the BIA’s nexus decision in S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996)).
70. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 927 (B.I.A. 1999) (“In sum, we find that the respondent
has been the victim of tragic and severe spouse abuse. We further find that her husband’s motivation, to the extent it can be ascertained, has varied; some abuse occurred because of his warped
perception of and reaction to her behavior, while some likely arose out of psychological disorder,
pure meanness, or no apparent reason at all.”); Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Gender-Based
Asylum: An Analysis of Recent Trends, 77 No. 42 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1533, 1535 (2000) (stating that in D-K- (B.I.A. Jan. 20, 2000), the immigration judge “denied asylum, ruling that Ms.
Kuna had not been persecuted on account of her membership in either group, or for any political
reason, but solely because her husband was ‘a despicable person’ ”).
71. Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 389–422 (2014).
72. A notable exception, however, existed with respect to Ninth Circuit case law that had
held that the nexus requirement was satisfied where the persecutor was motivated at least in
part—rather than in central part—by a protected ground. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 162–63
(2005).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
74. J-B-N-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007).
75. See ANKER, supra note 69, at § 5:12.
76. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 985–90 (5th ed. 2009); Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO.
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this lack of statutory guidance and the judicial deference afforded to the
agency, the Trump Administration, through Acting Attorney General Rosen,
held that “[t]o establish the necessary nexus, the protected ground: (1) must
be a but-for cause of the wrongdoer’s act; and (2) must play more than a minor
role[, and] . . . cannot be incidental or tangential to another reason for the
act.” 77 Elaborating further, the attorney general explained that where an individual is targeted as a means to another end—for example, targeting a son in
order to force a father to comply with the persecutor’s demand—there is no
nexus because the persecutor has no particular animus against the family. 78 So
though the “applicant’s status as a member of his father’s immediate family
may have been a but-for cause of the harm he suffered,” it was “not a ‘central’
reason” according to Rosen. 79 Rosen’s application of his own rule makes clear
that the second part of the test, in effect, swallows the first and makes the test
more, not less, burdensome than it had been, even after passage of the REAL
ID Act. The Trump Administration used the opportunity created by agency
discretion to interpret and apply the law to fashion a policy that would provide
the least amount of protection possible.
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, just prior to leaving office, the Trump
Administration tried to implement a cadre of new discretionary bars to asylum by invoking the statutory authority given to the attorney general to establish by regulation “additional limitations and conditions . . . under which [a
noncitizen] shall be ineligible for asylum.” 80 The regulation represented the
most radical and breathtaking restriction on the scope of asylum ever proposed. 81 It designated three factors as “significantly adverse.” 82 Those factors
barred asylum for individuals who: (1) “unlawful[ly] ent[er]” or attempt to
enter the United States, with just a narrow exception for those fleeing from “a
contiguous country;” (2) fail to “seek asylum or refugee protection in at least
one country” through which they “transited before entering the” U.S.; and (3)
use “fraudulent documents to enter the United States, unless the [noncitizen]
arrived . . . by air, sea, or land directly from the applicant’s home country
without transiting through any other country.” 83 The rule also created nine
other “adverse factors” that all but guaranteed “the denial of asylum as a matter of discretion.” 84 Such factors included any individual who has: (1) “spent

L. REV. 377 (2014) [hereinafter Gupta, New Nexus]; Anjum Gupta, Nexus Redux, 90 IND. L.J. 465
(2015) [hereinafter Gupta, New Redux].
77. Matter of A-B- II, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199, 208, 212 (A.G. 2021) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 209.
79. Id.
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(c).
81. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable
Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003,
1208, and 1235).
82. Id. at 80, 282.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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more than 14 days in any one country that permitted application for refugee,
asylee, or similar protections prior to entering or arriving in the United
States”; (2) traveled through “more than one country prior to arrival in the”
U.S.; (3) incurred certain criminal convictions that remain valid for immigration purposes; (4) accrued “more than one year of unlawful presence” prior to
filing an application for asylum; (5) failed to file a required tax return; (6) “had
two or more prior asylum applications denied for any reason”; (7) “withdr[ew]
an asylum application with prejudice or . . . abandoned an asylum application”; (8) missed an asylum interview; or (9) failed to “file a motion to reopen
within one year” of a change in circumstances. 85 Only where such applicants
could establish “extraordinary circumstances . . . involving national security
or foreign policy considerations,” or demonstrate “by clear and convincing
evidence, that the denial . . . would result in an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” can they possibly overcome these new asylum bars. 86
The rule appeared to be a calculated attempt to guarantee the denial of as
many claims as possible. Given the urgency surrounding the need to flee persecution, many bona fide asylum seekers are unable to wait in their country
long enough to obtain a visa to enter the U.S. For those few who have the resources and ability to seek a U.S. visa from a third country, the requirement
of nonimmigrant intent ensures that if an applicant discloses her fear of persecution, and thus her intent to abandon her foreign residence, she will not be
granted a U.S. visa to enter. If she obtains a visa by misrepresenting her true
intentions to seek asylum in the U.S. or by presenting fraudulent documents,
she would have faced denial under the new rule. If she remained for more than
two weeks in that third country while waiting for her visa decision, she would
have faced an additional ground of denial under the rule. If she accurately
represented her intentions during her visa interview—resulting in a denial of
her visa—and was thus forced to travel through other countries to present
herself at a U.S. port of entry, she would have added yet another reason for
denial under the rule. Once she arrived at the U.S. border, because of arbitrarily created wait times and the Remain in Mexico policy, she would have been
denied entry. If, out of fear and desperation, she sought to enter the U.S. outside of a port of entry to seek asylum from within the U.S., she would have
incurred yet another reason for denial under the rule.
This final regulation was aptly dubbed the “death to asylum” regulation,
and it represented the apotheosis of the Trump Administration’s efforts to
create “unsolvable dilemmas” for refugees and asylum seekers. 87 In fact, White
House Senior Policy Adviser, Stephen Miller, candidly admitted that stopping

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Bill Frelick, The Trump Administration’s Final Insult and Injury to Refugees, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Dec. 11, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/11/trump-administrations-final-insult-and-injury-refugees# [perma.cc/5QFE-BZT5].
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asylum seekers was “all [he] care[d] about” 88 and that he would have been
“happy if not a single refugee foot ever again touched America’s soil.” 89 While
this “death to asylum” regulation never went into effect—having been enjoined by a federal court because Chad Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting
Secretary of DHS at the time the rules were promulgated—the statutory authority employed by the Trump Administration to create this rule (i.e., 8
U.S.C. § 1158(5)(B)) remains on the books.
Each of the foregoing examples illustrates that the conditions that made
possible many of the changes implemented by the Trump Administration
long predated President Trump. The posture of extreme deference permeating the U.S. asylum system emanates both from the asylum statute itself and
from long-standing principles of administrative law. The significant degree to
which courts have deferred to agency constructions of the asylum statute and
regulations are well-established features of Chevron and Auer deference. Under the Chevron deference doctrine, a court first determines whether Congress
clearly expressed its intent with regard to “the precise question at issue” by
employing the “traditional tools of statutory construction.” 90 Where a statute
is ambiguous, however, the court is required to defer to any reasonable or permissible agency interpretation, even where that interpretation is contrary to a
prior construction by that court. 91 This two-step approach also applies to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations (referred to as Auer deference). 92 Taken together, these statutory and judicially created doctrines of deference grant the executive branch near hegemony in fashioning U.S. asylum
policy.
III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
As noted above, the Biden Administration has begun the process of rolling back Trump-era executive orders, vacating some past attorney general
opinions, issuing new policy guidelines, and embarking on the first steps to

88. Molly Olmstead, Stephen Miller: Stopping Asylum-Seekers Is “All I Care About,” SLATE
(Feb. 21, 2020, 1:21 PM, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/02/stephen-miller-immigration-this-is-my-life.html [perma.cc/3MTV-L4EH].
89. See Ellen Cranley, Stephen Miller Said He ‘Would be Happy If Not a Single Refugee’
Came to the US, According to Ex Trump Aide, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2019, 10:42 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/stephen-miller-said-he-would-be-happy-if-not-a-single-refugee-came-to-us-2019-1 [perma.cc/ZQ4C-948V]; see also Michael D. Shear & Maggie Habberman, Trump’s Temporary Halt to Immigration Is Part of Broader Plan, Stephen Miller Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/politics/coronavirus-trumpimmigration-stephen-miller.html [perma.cc/Z34A-7QT6].
90. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9 (1984).
91. Id.; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229, 237 (2001); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 (2005).
92. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412
(2019).
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promulgate new regulations, ostensibly to realign the U.S. with its international treaty obligations. 93 As laudable as the administration’s promises are,
we are still waiting to see how they will be implemented. As measured by the
administration’s foot-dragging on new substantive asylum regulations, use of
Title 42 expulsions, and its mishandling of claims presented by Haitians at the
southern border, there are serious reasons to be concerned. However, even if
positive changes are on the horizon, none will be insulated from further revision or deconstruction by some future administration that wishes to revert to
the cruel policies of the past. So where do we go from here?
We contend that Congress, the administration, and the courts must take
action to provide an enduring solution to this crisis, one that ensures that future presidents cannot defy our international obligations under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol. We do not purport to offer a comprehensive solution here, but we do endeavor to sketch out a broad array of solutions that
would markedly improve the status quo.
First, we concur with the excellent policy proposals that have been advanced by scholars to improve the functioning and fairness of the asylum system. 94 Such reforms include repealing the attorney general’s authority to
create additional discretionary bars; ensuring that asylum, like withholding of
removal, is a mandatory form of protection; repealing the provision of law
relied upon by President Trump to create the Remain in Mexico policy; granting increased independence to immigration courts by making them Article I
courts; and creating mechanisms for indigent asylum seekers to be appointed
counsel. 95 Several of these changes were proposed in the Refugee Protection
Act of 2019, sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Zoe
Lofgren. 96 However, the bill has yet to pass.
Adding to that list of substantive and procedural remedies, we advocate
for an explicit legislative prohibition on prosecuting asylum seekers who enter
the U.S. without authorization, consistent with our international treaty obligations under Article 31 of the Refugee Convention. Article 31 provides that
states “shall not impose penalties, on account of [the] illegal entry or presence,
on refugees who . . . enter or are present . . . without authorization, provided
they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause
for their illegal entry or presence.” 97 Coupled with this added legislative protection, Congress should include a provision barring the separation of parents
93. See, e.g., Matter of A-B- II, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021); Matter of L-E-A- III, 28 I.
& N. Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021); Exec. Order No. 14010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,267 (Feb. 2, 2021).
94. See e.g., SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 124–29; T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
DONALD KERWIN, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. & ZOLBERG INST. ON MIGRATION & MOBILITY,
IMPROVING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE BIDEN
ADMINISTRATION (2020), https://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Improving-theUS-Immigration-System_Proposals_FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/BTT5-MU26].
95. See sources cited supra note 94.
96. S. 2936, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 5210, 116th Cong. (2019).
97. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 31(1), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 (emphasis added).
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and children except where the best interest of the child requires it. Such
changes would protect against any future effort to adopt a policy such as
“zero-tolerance.”
Relatedly, Congress should clarify that public health-related expulsions
cannot be myopically pursued at the expense of our international legal obligations to provide asylum to bona fide refugees presenting themselves at U.S.
borders. While managing present and future public health crises is important,
it is a false bifurcation that the U.S. can only pursue one of these objectives at
a time. Alongside testing, social distancing, masking, vaccinations, and contact tracing, asylum and refugee processing can coexist. 98 There may be reasonable and necessary processing delays at the border and in refugee camps
that occur during a pandemic, but Congress should foreclose the use of any
public health crises as a pretext to freeze our humanitarian obligations.
To strengthen the refugee resettlement system in the U.S., Congress
should increase funding afforded to domestic refugee resettlement organizations, both to offset the dramatic cuts experienced during the Trump era and
to provide more sustainable funding levels to ensure resettlement organizations are able to execute adroitly their mission of welcoming refugees into the
U.S. As these organizations are scrambling to meet the needs of Afghan evacuees, more resources are needed, particularly to assist with the process of seeking asylum. 99
Likewise, we contend that Congress should adopt the familiar but-for
causation test (without the second part of Attorney General Rosen’s test) as a
safe harbor provision that is sufficient to establish that the persecution occurred “on account of” the applicant’s protected characteristic. That is, where
an applicant can show that but for the protected characteristic, the persecution
would not have occurred (or would have been much less likely to occur), the
nexus requirement will have been met. 100 In the domestic violence context, for
example, the “but-for” approach would provide asylum applicants with a clear
benchmark for demonstrating nexus, as applicants would be able to show that
but for their membership in a particular social group (defined by gender and
other characteristics), the abuse would likely not have occurred. The but-for
causation model recognizes that there may be many causes for abuse, each of
which is necessary for the abuse to occur, but the existence of multiple necessary factors does not negate the fact that any one of those factors is an actual
cause of the abuse. 101 In asylum law, such a model would recognize that while
the persecutor’s “despicable” or “criminal” nature may have been one reason
for the abuse, the applicant’s protected status was not only another reason for
the abuse, but was a necessary reason. This approach, which shifts the focus

98. Letter to CDC Director, supra note 35.
99. Marco Poggio, 83,000 Afghans Made It to the US. Now They Need Lawyers, LAW360
(Feb. 6, 2022, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1462197/83-000-afghans-made-it-tothe-us-now-they-need-lawyers [perma.cc/3MCV-GZ99].
100. Gupta, New Nexus, supra note 76, at 383.
101. Id.
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from the intent of the persecutor to the status of the applicant, would also
more closely conform to the BIA’s recognition that individuals should be protected from persecution that occurs on account of characteristics they are unable to change or should not be required to change. 102 Further, such a
modification would put an end to the BIA’s flawed means-to-an-end reasoning and realign U.S. law more closely with international standards. 103
In regard to substantive asylum eligibility, the nonstate actor test should
be clarified through notice-and-comment rulemaking, such that requisite
state protection is measured by whether the applicant has suffered past persecution from a nonstate actor (and thus the state failed to protect) or whether
the applicant possesses a well-founded fear of future harm that the state is either unable or unwilling to prevent. Once an applicant establishes past persecution at the hands of a nonstate actor, the state’s unwillingness or inability to
protect should be presumed, and the burden should shift to the Department
of Homeland Security to show that the state is, in fact, willing and able to stop
the persecution. The reformed state protection test should also clarify that
there is no penalty for refugees who reasonably elect not to seek state protection. 104
With respect to particular social group analysis, the new “particularity”
and “social distinction” requirements should be eliminated by regulation. 105
These additional social group requirements, in the hands of xenophobic adjudicators, are too easily utilized to deny asylum to those with legitimate fear of
harm due to characteristics they are powerless to change. 106 Accordingly, the
“immutability” test should be restored as the correct and sufficient test for the
cognizability of particular social groups. Under the immutability test, groups
based on gender, for example, would be explicitly recognized as cognizable
social groups.

102. Id. at 390 n.45.
103. See Gupta, New Nexus, supra note 76; see also Gupta, Nexus Redux, supra note 76
(providing an alternative basis for proving nexus in the small number of cases where it may not
be possible to show but-for causation). This alternative burden-shifting framework begins with
a prima facie showing that the protected ground played a role in bringing about the persecution,
similar to the “contributing cause” standard proposed by other scholars. See, e.g., Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 265 (2002); James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Causal Connection (“Nexus”) to
a Convention Ground, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461 (2003).
104. See Law Scholars Urge DOJ and DHS to Adopt Protective Regulations Related to Nonstate Actor Persecution, AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N (May 27, 2021), https://www.aila.org/infonet/law-scholars-urge-doj-and-dhs-to-adopt-protective [perma.cc/S8MX-EGSX]; Andrew
Paul Janco, ‘Unwilling’: The One-Word Revolution in Refugee Status, 23 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST.
429 (2014).
105. See Stephen Legomsky & Karen Musalo, Asylum and the Three Little Words That Can
Spell Life or Death (May 28, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/76671/asylum-and-the-threelittle-words-that-can-spell-life-or-death. [perma.cc/W6D7-K8NK].
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Finally, informed by the lessons learned from the Trump era—and the
antecedents that made that era possible—one core feature of any lasting solution to shore up asylum protections must include curbing the current degree
of explicit and implicit deference afforded to the executive branch to narrow
access to asylum and refugee protection. Whatever merits may exist for the
Chevron and Auer deference doctrines in general, recent experience has
demonstrated that rather than unique agency expertise in administering this
area of law, animus can become the driving force in adopting one interpretation over another. For this reason, scholars have called for an explicit end to
the practice of courts granting Chevron and Auer deference to the immigration agency’s decisions interpreting statutes and regulations, particularly as it
relates to asylum and withholding. 107 These forms of protection are anchored
in our international treaty obligations, which constitute the supreme law of
the land, and represent an area of law where courts are best able to handle
questions of statutory interpretation. 108
The flexibility Congress granted to the executive branch was never intended to be used to circumscribe access so significantly to asylum as to constitute its functional demise. Congress intended for U.S. law to embody the
full protections encompassed within our international treaty obligations as
provided for in the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Shortly after the passage of the Refugee Act, the Supreme Court examined its legislative history
and explained that Congress “believed that apparent differences between the
Protocol and existing statutory law could be reconciled by the Attorney General . . . and did not require any modification of statutory language.” 109 The
Court noted that “to the extent that domestic law was more generous than the
Protocol, the Attorney General would not alter existing practice.” 110 Of critical
importance here, the Court explained that “to the extent that the Protocol was
more generous than the bare text of [the statute,] . . . the Attorney General
would honor the requirements of the Protocol and hence there was no need
for modifying the language of [the statute] itself.” 111 In other words, the liberty
Congress granted to the executive to administer the asylum system was intended to be used to remain faithful to our core obligations under international law and to maximize protection, not diminish them.
Should courts continue to afford some deference to the immigration
agency’s asylum and refugee decisions, courts must recognize that deference
is not absolute. Noting the “[r]epeated egregious failures of the Immigration
Court and the Board to exercise care commensurate with the stakes in an asylum case,” even before the Trump Administration, some judges have observed

107. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197 (2021); Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127 (2019).
108. Sweeney, supra note 107.
109. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1984).
110. Id. at 429 n.22.
111. Id.
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that “[d]eference is earned; it is not a birthright.” 112 The aim of the Refugee
Act was to codify the U.S.’s obligations to provide safety to bona fide refugees.
Thus, we contend that courts should view the immigration agency’s adjudicatory interpretations (whether of statutes or regulations) that have the effect of
restricting asylum with some skepticism and, at an absolute minimum, strictly
adhere to the Supreme Court’s instructions cabining deference. 113
CONCLUSION
Though not a panacea, the legislative, regulatory, and judicial shifts in the
administration of asylum and refugee law for which we advocate here would
go a long way in preventing the sort of norm-defying abuses witnessed during
the Trump era. At the heart of what made those abuses possible is an excess of
discretionary authority to restrict access to asylum. Such legally sanctioned
discretion casts a penumbra of judicial obsequiousness. And within that
shadow, as recent history has shown, an administration can take license to
pursue an agenda that defies the humanitarian ethos undergirding our refugee
and asylum systems. In an executive authority that lacks even a modicum of
commitment to international human rights, the U.S. asylum system can cease
to function. While the Biden Administration may eventually make good on
its promise to strengthen and restore the U.S. asylum system—and we sincerely hope it does—those changes would last only as long as the tenure of its
ideological proponent. As such, a paradigm shift is needed. If we are to take
down the administrative wall of ineligibility and durably reconstruct a more
just, fair, and welcoming system for asylum seekers, let us do so on a firmer
foundation. Our refugee and asylum systems should be grounded upon the
normative judgment that refugees deserve protection, and that core obligation
must not be subject to degradation in the name of deference.
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